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The Unpredictability of Patent Litigation
Damage Awards: Causes and Comparative Notes
by Axel Schmitt-Nilson1
Patent damage awards are an area of great
concern in the public debate regarding the patent
system. It is not only the horrendous numbers that
are staggering to the newspaper reader. It is also the
large amount of uncertainty that patent infringement
suits raise, leading to business-threatening situations.
This paper explores the underlying reasons for the
current patent damage framework and contrasts U.S.
procedures with those in Germany. Section A examines
the general link between patent valuation and litigation
damage awards. Basic principles of patent damage
law are explored in section B. Section C examines the
commonly applied, highly fact-intensive framework
of a reasonable royalty analysis. Section D looks at
current trends within that framework. A comparative
analysis between the findings and the more formalistic
German patent damage regime is laid out in section E.
1

I.

Patent Valuation and the Role of Litigation
Damage Awards

With a growing portion of today’s businesses
having numerous intangible intellectual property
(IP) assets, the importance of valuing these assets is
increasing. A price tag has to be attached to all forms
of intellectual property for a number of reasons,
including IP audits carried out for issuing corporate
financial statements, public offers, mergers and
acquisitions. Valuation of IP is extremely difficult,
because each piece of intellectual property is different
from another, making the value inquiry highly
contextual and fact-specific.2 It is apparent that
important factors for a comprehensive value analysis are
the likelihood of invalidity of the patent, the size of the
1. German Patent Attorney, European Trademark and Design
Attorney, LL.M. candidate at American University Washington
College of Law. Before entering the legal field, he studied electrical
engineering, earning the degrees of Diplom-Ingenieur from
University of Technology Munich and Master of Science from
Stanford University. He received his legal education in Germany
from FernUniversität Hagen, the German Patent and Trademark
Office and the Federal Patent Court.
2. See, e.g., Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318
F. Supp. 1116, 1119-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (where the parties’ views
regarding a reasonable royalty for a patent differed by a factor of
30. This led the court to compile a list of 15 factual inquiries to be
made when assessing the reasonableness of royalties).

market for the protected product, and the availability of
substitutes for the patented technology.
As such a comprehensive analysis is not feasible
for every instance where a price tag is required, basic
valuation metrics have been developed that tie the value
of the IP at hand to a more readily accessible number.
For example, the “25% Rule” estimates the value of
the patent to be 25% of the gross profits before taxes
realized with the product embodied in the patent.3
Another example is the “5% method”, which deems
5% of the sum of all sales to be the value of the patent.4
It is also possible to estimate the investment associated
with the development of a design and use that number
as the ceiling of the patent value.
These and other simplified approaches not
only inherently lack accuracy; they also fail to take
into account the different motives for seeking patent
protection and the “subjective” values associated
therewith. Some companies merely want to build up
their patent rights in order to have leverage in crosslicensing negotiations. Other companies enforce their
patents to protect their market share. Non-practicing
entities use patents as an asset only, and try to extract
as much licensing value as possible. For start-up
companies, having a patented technology is often a
huge sales argument and helps them to acquire venture
capital. A further complexity in the value inquiry arises
from the territoriality of patents. Patents for the same
technology can have greatly diverging values in different
jurisdictions, depending on the respective markets, legal
frameworks, and enforcement mechanisms.
In this thicket of value aspects and valuation
methods, damage awards in patent infringement suits
serve a strong notice function. They demonstrate
the value that can be extracted from a patent when
used for its intended purpose to prevent the making,
using, offering, or selling of a patented invention.5 As
litigation awards set the frame for both the potential
3. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292,
1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
4. See John S. Torkelson, Calculating Reasonable Royalty
Damages for Infringement of Early-Stage Technology Patents, 4
Sedona Conf. J. 47, 63 (2003).
5. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).
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return a patentee can hope for and the risk an infringer
is running by violating a patent right, the numbers
emanating from patent infringement suits heavily
influence license negotiations and patent valuation.6
The RIM v. NTP saga is an illustrative example,
showing that the fear of a large damage award raises the
settlement value.7
II. Introduction to Damages in Patent
Litigation
The patent statute does not provide much
guidance on how to calculate damages in patent
infringement cases.8 The only relevant provision states
that the infringer owes the patentee “damages adequate
to compensate for the infringement, but in no event
less than a reasonable royalty.”9 The Federal Circuit has
also affirmed that a reasonable royalty is the absolute
minimum a patentee can expect.10
Besides providing the floor on damage
awards, the reasonable royalty analysis is also the most
commonly used method to calculate damages.11 This
is because of the fact that the lost profits analysis,
which is the alternative method of calculating damages,
poses severe evidentiary problems for the patentee. In
accordance with the commonly applied four-factor
test for calculating lost profits, the patentee has to
establish “(1) demand for the patented product; (2)
absence of acceptable non-infringing substitutes; (3)
manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the
demand; and (4) the amount of profit it would have
been made.”12 Where a non-practicing entity is the
plaintiff, the lost profits method is by definition not
6. See Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured
Approach to Calculating Reasonable Royalties, 14 Lewis & Clark L.
Rev. 627, 642 (2010).
7. David Weston & Dr. Kwanghui Lim, Intellectual
Property Research Institute of Australia, BlackBerry, A
Teaching Case for WIPO 6 (2008), available at http://www.
wipo.int/ export/sites/www/academy/en/ipacademies/educational_
materials/cs2_blackberry.pdf (facing the possibility of a $1 billion or
more damage award led to a settlement of $612.5 million).
8. See 35 U.S.C. §284 (2006).
9. Id.
10. See Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d
1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“A reasonable royalty is . . . merely the
floor below which damages shall not fall.”) (citation omitted).
11. See Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2010 Patent
Litigation Study: The Continued Evolution of Patent
Damages Law 12 chart 4 (2010).
12. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545
(Fed. Cir. 1995)(“Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc.,
575 F.2d 1152, 197 U.S.P.Q. 726 (6th Cir.1978) articulated a
four-factor test that has since been accepted as a useful, but nonexclusive, way for a patentee to prove entitlement to lost profits
damages.”).
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applicable, because the plaintiff does not engage in its
own production and can therefore not lose production
profits.13
Accordingly, the reasonable royalty analysis
is more of a last resort than a desired framework.14
It has the inherent problem that it creates a circular
relationship between damage awards and negotiated
license agreements.15 The higher damage awards rise,
the more licensing fees patentees will ask for, which
in turn will be reflected in increased damage awards.
While such a circle leads to the overcompensation
of the patentee, it is logical that an opposite
circular development could lead to a structural
undercompensation of the patentee as well.
It is difficult to accept this and other
imperfections of the reasonable royalty analysis,
because the damage calculation is “an area of the
law where reliability and precision are deemed
paramount.”16 Reliability and precision are not only
of crucial importance to justify potentially businessdestroying damage awards in the high-stakes field
of patent litigation, but they are also essential to
create a framework that delivers predictable damage
awards.17 Only predictable results let businesses make
sound decisions regarding their IP strategies and their
research and development.18 Unfortunately however,
attempts to make the reasonable royalty analysis as
precise and comprehensive as possible have resulted in
unpredictable and seemingly arbitrary damage awards,
which is the opposite of the desired result.
III. The Reasonable Royalty Framework and its
Impact on Predictability
There are multiple examples in patent litigation
where the jury awarded damages that are more or
less in the middle of the damages demanded by the
13. See Christopher B. Seaman, The Changing Patent
Damages Regime: Reasonable Royalties After Lucent and
Willful Infringement After Seagate 11(presented at the AIPLA
2011 Annual Meeting, Oct. 20, 2011).
14. See Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575
F.2d 1152, 1157 (6th Cir. 1978) (“When actual damages, e.g.,
lost profits, cannot be proved, the patent owner is entitled to a
reasonable royalty.”).
15. See Durie & Lemley, supra note 6, at 642.
16. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292,
1312 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
17. See Merritt J. Hasbrouck, Protecting the Gates of Reasonable
Royalty, 11 John Marshall Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 192, 193 (2011)
(“Patents require proper protection through clear guidance from the
legislature and predictable results from the judiciary.”).
18. See id. (“Clear and predictable patent damages rules that
lead to fair damages awards encourage subsequent inventors to
improve upon existing inventions.”).
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patentee and the number deemed appropriate by the
defendant.19 In Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway,
Inc., the patentee, Lucent, had asked the jury for an
award of $561.9 million, while the defendant Microsoft
claimed that $6.5 million would be a reasonable
royalty.20 The jury awarded $357.7 million to Lucent.21
Does that mean that 50% of the damages amount
asked for by the patentee is the best predictor of the
damage award?22 Why are juries not able to assume a
more differentiated view to calculate a truly reasonable
royalty?
The underlying idea of the reasonable royalty
analysis is to reconstruct a hypothetical negotiation
scenario between the patentee and the infringer.23 The
“willing licensor – willing licensee” approach tries to
take into account the bargaining positions of the parties
before the start of litigation, assuming the “asserted
patent claims are valid and infringed.”24 The court,
therefore, takes a mainly economic approach, looking
at what business decisions the parties would have made
at a past point in time. An inquiry into the dynamics
of a hypothetical negotiation is obviously very complex.
In order to make the task reasonable, Georgia-Pacific
Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp. proposed a non-exclusive
15-factor test in order to guide the factual questions
around the hypothetical negotiation.25 Those factors
are:
1. The royalties received by the
patentee for the licensing of the patent
in suit, proving or tending to prove an
established royalty.
2. The rates paid by the licensee for the
use of other patents comparable to the
patent in suit.
3. The nature and scope of the license,
as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as
restricted or non-restricted in terms of
territory or with respect to whom the
manufactured product may be sold.
19. See e.g. Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1311 (resulting in a jury award
of $388 million, after the plaintiff had asked for $565 million).
20. See Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d
1301, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
21. See id. at 1324.
22. See Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1311.
23. See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1324 (looking at what the patentee
“would have received through arms-length bargaining”).
24. Id. at 1325.
25. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318
F.Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).

4. The licensor’s established policy
and marketing program to maintain
his patent monopoly by not licensing
others to use the invention or by
granting licenses under special
conditions designed to preserve that
monopoly.
5. The commercial relationship
between the licensor and licensee, such
as, whether they are competitors in
the same territory in the same line of
business; or whether they are inventor
and promoter.
6. The effect of selling the patented
specialty in promoting sales of other
products of the licensee; that existing
value of the invention to the licensor as
a generator of sales of his non-patented
items; and the extent of such derivative
or convoyed sales.
7. The duration of the patent and the
term of the license.
8. The established profitability of the
product made under the patent; its
commercial success; and its current
popularity.
9. The utility and advantages of the
patent property over the old modes or
devices, if any, that had been used for
working out similar results.
10. The nature of the patented
invention; the character of the
commercial embodiment of it as
owned and produced by the licensor;
and the benefits to those who have
used the invention.
11. The extent to which the infringer
has made use of the invention; and any
evidence probative of the value of that
use.
12. The portion of the profit or of the
selling price that may be customary
in the particular business or in
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comparable businesses to allow for
the use of the invention or analogous
inventions.
13. The portion of the realizable
profit that should be credited to the
invention as distinguished from nonpatented elements, the manufacturing
process, business risks, or significant
features or improvements added by the
infringer.
14. The opinion testimony of qualified
experts.
15. The amount that a licensor (such
as the patentee) and a licensee (such
as the infringer) would have agreed
upon (at the time the infringement
began) if both had been reasonably
and voluntarily trying to reach an
agreement; that is, the amount which
a prudent licensee- who desired, as
a business proposition, to obtain
a license to manufacture and sell
a particular article embodying the
patented invention- would have been
willing to pay as a royalty and yet
be able to make a reasonable profit
and which amount would have been
acceptable by a prudent patentee who
was willing to grant a license.26
Although this 15-factor test comes from a
district court decision from 1970, it is still good law
for any reasonable royalty analysis. The Federal Circuit
reiterated in Uniloc that the court “has sanctioned
the use of the Georgia-Pacific factors to frame the
reasonable royalty inquiry.”27 Commentators have gone
so far as to call the Georgia-Pacific factors the “gospel in
the patent damages world.”28
In addition to maintaining such a complex
framework for the general inquiry, the Federal Circuit
has expressly prohibited simplification through
standardized methods, even in fact-specific cases.29 The
damage calculation has to be tied to the facts of the case
26.
27.
28.
29.
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Id.
Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1317.
See Durie & Lemely, supra note 6, at 631.
See Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1315.

in order to satisfy the burden of proving damages.30
Consequently, a simplified approach, such as the “25
percent rule of thumb,” is a “fundamentally flawed tool
for determining a baseline royalty rate in a hypothetical
negotiation.”31
The unpredictability of reasonable royalty
awards stems from four factors. First, the GeorgiaPacific factors address such a wide range of issues that
their application may have partly re-enforcing and
partly contradicting effects.32 Valid reasons can be
found for almost any sort of weighing of the factors.33
The first two factors aim to establish a comparison to
other licenses.34 Factors 3 and 7 look at the objective
properties of the hypothetical license.35 Factors 4
and 5 take into account the bargaining positions of
the parties and the licensing policy of the patentee.36
Factors 6, 8, 9 and 10 assess the commercial advantage
of the patented technology and the additional effect
such patented technology has on other products in the
eye of the consumer.37 Factors 11 to 13 look at the
extent of usage by the infringer and the impact on his
profits.38 While factor 14 enforces the allowability of
expert testimony, factor 15 sums up the hypothetical
negotiation scenario framework.39 Juries will have a
hard time applying 15 interrelated factors to the facts
of the case and balance the respective outcomes.40 A
predictable outcome is almost impossible.
Second, the judge can be equally lost in
this framework as the gate-keeper of evidence. It is
the court’s responsibility to “ensur[e] that all expert
testimony must pertain to scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge under Federal Rule of Evidence
. . . 702.”41 However, almost any piece of evidence
or any piece of expert testimony may be argued to
relate to one of the Georgia-Pacific factors, which cover
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. See Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d
1301, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (the factors “appear somewhat to
offset one another”).
33. See id. (“A jury could have reasonably concluded otherwise
with several of the factors mentioned here.”).
34. See Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F.Supp. at 1120.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See Durie & Lemely, supra note 6, at 631 (“[A] nonexclusive fifteen-factor test that requires balancing and consideration
of the interactions between the factors is likely to give little or no
practical guidance to a jury.”).
41. Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1315.
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both technical and business aspects of both parties.42
A court will be hard-pressed to not allow a carefully
outlined testimony, which ties the facts of the case
to above factors, no matter how absurd the resulting
damage figure may seem. Also, the court has very few
means of preventing the jury from hearing information
that inevitably skews their judgment.43
Third, the 15-factor framework all but prevents
a finding of clear error on a review level.44 Deference
has been traditionally high in patent damage questions,
because a “jury’s damage award must be upheld unless
the amount is grossly excessive or monstrous, clearly
not supported by the evidence, or based only on
speculation or guesswork.”45 Recently, the Federal
Circuit has looked more closely at the evidence
supporting the damage award. In Uniloc, the damage
award was vacated because of the non-allowable
application of the “25 percent rule of thumb.”46 In
Lucent, the court held that the award of a lump sum
payment was not supported by the evidence of running
royalty licenses, which had been brought forward as
comparable.47 Despite these attempts to require “sound
economic proof of the nature of the market and likely
outcomes” of the hypothetical negotiation, the level
of deference will remain high in the framework of a
15-factor test.48
Fourth, expert testimony is likely to prevail
as the single most effective and jury-convincing
piece of evidence.49 In the thicket of a 15-factor test
with complex interrelations, the jury’s easiest way to
deal with the balancing task at hand is to trust the
convincing testimony of a qualified expert, which
is explicitly called for by Georgia-Pacific factor 14.50
This is all the more true, because the hypothetical
negotiation scenario aims at including subjective
factors, such as the parties bargaining power and their
42. See Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
43. See id. at 1320 (“The disclosure that a company has made
$19 billion dollars in revenue from an infringing product cannot
help but skew the damages horizon for the jury.”).
44. See Durie & Lemely, supra note 6, at 628.
45. Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp.
2d 279, 285 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (citation omitted); see also Durie
& Lemely, supra note 6, at 645 (providing statistical data on
overturned cases).
46. See Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1318.
47. See Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d
1301, 1325-32 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
48. IP Innovation L.L.C. v. Red Hat, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d
687, 689 (E.D. Tex. 2010).
49. See Durie & Lemely, supra note 6, at 643.
50. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F.
Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).

general policies of striking licensing deals.51 In Fujifilm
Corp. v. Benun, Fujifilm’s expert testified that a 40 cent
royalty for disposable photo cameras would have been
agreed upon because of Fujifilm’s strong bargaining
position, which seems to have had a big impact on the
jury justifying the damage award.52 Accordingly, the
option of swaying the jury with well-targeted expert
testimony will still be available to patentees.
IV. Current Emphasis within the Reasonable
Royalty Framework
Although the Federal Circuit goes to great
lengths to defend the comprehensive Georgia-Pacific
framework, there seems to be a recent emphasis on
some selected factors.53 Uniloc particularly stressed
the importance of comparable licenses and the profit
portion that is customarily attributed to comparable
inventions.54 Lucent scrutinized the aspects of
comparable licenses, the nature of the patented
invention, the profit to be attributed to the invention,
and the extent of infringer use, while merely brushing
over the other factors.55 Accordingly, the main focus
of recent decisions seems to be truly comparable
licenses and a correct apportionment of the infringing
component’s contribution to the entire product value.56
A. Comparable Licenses
Truly comparable licenses provide the best
basis for a reasonable royalty analysis. In other
words, “an established royalty is usually the best
measure of a ‘reasonable’ royalty for a given use of an
invention.”57 However, in light of the recent decisions,
the license argued to be comparable must be truly
comparable. Besides the rejection of the allegedly
comparable licenses in Lucent, as discussed above, the
51. Id. (see, in particular, factors 4 and 5).
52. See Fujifilm Corp. v. Benum, 605 F.3d 1366, 1372-73
(Fed. Cir. 2010).
53. See Seaman, supra note 13.
54. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292,
1317-18 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“In particular, factors 1 and 2 – looking
at royalties paid or received in licenses for the patent in suit or in
comparable licenses – and factor 12 – looking at the portion of
profit that may be customarily allowed in the particular business
for the use of the invention or similar inventions – remain valid
and important factors in the determination of a reasonable royalty
rate.”).
55. See Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d
1301, 1325-35 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (factors 2, 10, 11 and 13 were
discussed in separate sections, while all other factors were lumped
into an “other factors” category).
56. See Seaman, supra note 13.
57. IP Innovation L.L.C. v. Red Hat, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d
687, 691 (E.D. Tex. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Federal Circuit also objected to the reliance on “rebundling licenses” that “had no relation to the claimed
invention.”58 In Wordtech Systems, Inc. v. Integrated
Network Solutions, Inc., it was reiterated that lump sum
licenses could only be compared to other lump sum
licenses, unless there is evidence regarding a conversion
between running royalties and lump sum payments.59
Also, an averaging of previous licenses is inherently
flawed and can therefore not be used as a calculation
method.60 Under these circumstances, previous
license agreements will probably only be deemed
comparable in rare cases. Examples of such cases are
companies that have long-standing licensing policies
and companies that are required to give reasonable and
non-discriminatory licenses because of their contractual
obligations, such as companies contributing to patent
pools or licensing out standard-relevant patents.61
B. Apportionment and the Entire Market Rule
It is particularly difficult to calculate a
reasonable royalty when no comparable licenses are
available, the invention only affects a subportion
of a larger product, and the infringer is a reputable
company.62 The sales of a reputable company are
at least partially attributable to their brand name,
marketing, and customer services. If only sales data for
the product itself is available and the inventive feature is
merely one of many features of the product, some form
of analysis is necessary to apportion the contribution of
the invention to the success of the product.
Patentees commonly try to use the total
sales revenue of the product as a royalty basis for
the reasonable royalty analysis, because even a tiny
royalty rate may then lead to a large damage award.63
However, the patentee can only use this entire market
value of the accused product “where the patented
58. ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 870
(Fed. Cir. 2010).
59. See Wordtech Systems, Inc. v. Integrated Networks
Solutions, Inc., 609 F.3d 1308, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
60. See id.
61. See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d
297, 304 (3d Cir. 2007) (standard setting institutions require
their members to grant fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory
(FRAND) licensing terms in exchange for their technologies being
considered in the standard setting process).
62. See Seaman, supra note 13; see also Cornell Univ. v.
Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 288 (N.D.N.Y. 2009).
63. See, e.g., Cornell Univ., 609 F.Supp.2d at 283 (N.D.N.Y.
2009) (“Cornell originally sought damages on the revenue
from Hewlett-Packard’s entire server and workstation systems”,
although the claimed invention only referred to “a component of a
component within the processors used in Hewlett-Packard’s servers
and workstations.”).
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feature creates the basis for customer demand or
substantially creates the value of the component
parts.”64 The patentee is further required to present
evidence, such as “economic evidence, marketing
information, or customer surveys,” that this condition
is fulfilled.65 In the Lucent case, Lucent was able to
successfully argue the entire market rule because it
was not possible to show that the patented feature, a
calendar date picker, was the reason customers bought
Microsoft Outlook.66 Accordingly, most cases involving
complex systems require an apportionment analysis to
reach a fair royalty base.67
The apportionment analysis is fundamentally
an economic analysis. The conceptual starting
point is Georgia-Pacific factor 13, which is directed
to the “portion of the realizable profit that should
be credited to the invention as distinguished from
non-patented elements, the manufacturing process,
business risks, or significant features or improvements
added by the infringer.”68 Being an economic analysis,
apportionment allows all of the efforts undertaken
by the infringer that add to the value of the product,
but are not related to the patent, to be taken into
account.69 These contributions include the infringer’s
“own innovations, other investments in the product’s
research, development, and design, and effective
marketing, advertising, and sales strategies.”70 Also, the
infringer’s brand name, reputation for reliability, and
service should be taken into account.71 Furthermore,
the apportionment analysis has to deal with the
problem that synergies within a product are not
attributable to patented or non-patent features alone,
but to the combination of the two.72 The question
is then how to distribute the synergies among the
64. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292,
1318 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
65. See Seaman, supra note 13.
66. See Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d
1301, 1332-33 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
67. The court decisions are not free of contradictions
on this point. While Uniloc, Cornell and Red Hat require the
determination of both a reasonable royalty base and a reasonable
royalty rate, Lucent seems to suggest that it may be possible to use
the entire market value as the royalty base when offsetting the same
accordingly with a small royalty rate.
68. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F.Supp.
1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
69. See Seaman, supra note 13.
70. Id.
71. See Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d
279, 288 (N.D.N.Y. 2009).
72. See Elizabeth M. Bailey, Gregory K. Leonard & Mario
A. Lopez, Making Sense of “Apportionment” in Patent Damages, 12
Columbia Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 255, 262 (2011).

Spring 2012

features.

As is evident, apportionment leaves ample
room for argumentation over the correct royalty base.
Equally, it is highly debatable which royalty rate the
patentee and the infringer would have agreed upon
in a hypothetical arms-length negotiation. As the
royalty award is the multiplication of the royalty base
and the royalty rate, it is still subject to a great deal of
uncertainty in the apportionment framework.
C. Example of Apportionment in Cornell University
v. Hewlett-Packard Co.
Cornell is a very illustrative case regarding
apportionment. The jury awarded damages of $184
million to Cornell for Hewlett-Packard’s infringement
of a Cornell patent.73 Federal Circuit Judge Randal
R. Rader, sitting in the district court by designation,
overruled the jury award on a judgment as a matter
of law and lowered the award to $53 million.74 The
decision was based on a lack of apportionment in
the patentee’s evidence for the damage calculation
presented to the jury.75
The patent in this case was directed to “a
method for instruction issuance within a computer
processor,” wherein this method affected “one
component of the instruction reorder buffer (IRB),
itself a part of a computer processor.”76 The processor
is in turn part of a CPU module, which yields a CPU
brick when combined with “a temperature controlling
thermal solution, external cache memory, and a power
converter.”77 “A set of CPU bricks is then incorporated
into a cell board, and that cell board is finally inserted
into a server.”78 The entire server revenue was initially
used for Cornell’s damage calculation.79 After being
instructed that such an approach reflected a reliance
on the entire market rule that was inadmissible in
the absence of appropriate proof, Cornell based its
calculations on the CPU bricks, which led to a royalty
base of $23 billion.80 The jury used this calculation for
the damage award of $184 million.
The court’s reduction of the damage award was
based on the reduction of the royalty base. According
to the court, the starting point for the royalty base
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See Cornell, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 282.
See id. at 293.
See id. at 290.
Id. at 283.
Id.
Id.
See Cornell, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 283.
See id. at 284.

should be the “smallest salable infringing unit with
close relation to the claimed invention – namely the
processor itself.”81 Even if that unit is not actually sold,
an apportionment is inevitable, no matter if it has to
be based on assumptions.82 Seeing Hewlett-Packard’s
hypothetical processor revenue calculation to be the
only reliable evidence, the court reduced the royalty
base to $6.7 billion, leading to a damage award of $53
million.83
The outcome of this case is somewhat
unsatisfying, because the court did not think the
apportionment framework through to the end. The
decision gives no analysis how much the patented
method contributes to the instruction reorder buffer,
and how much the instruction reorder buffer actually
contributes to the processor. It does not ask what the
economic relevance of these contributions is. The
opinion gives the impression that the court was simply
content with reducing the damage award, which came
out low due to a very low royalty rate of 0.8%, which
the court left untouched. It is questionable if it makes
sense to look at the royalty base and the royalty rate
independently.84
V. Damage Calculations in Germany
The damage calculation framework employed
in the US is highly fact-intensive and aims at taking
into account all factors of the case. It is, however,
also possible that a legal system does not aim for such
factual completeness, but values procedural simplicity
and predictability. One example for such a legal system
is Germany, where the field of damage calculations is
mostly free of controversy. This is illustrated by the fact
that Schulte, the most renowned and ubiquitously used
commentary regarding German patent law, dedicates a
mere 11 out of almost 1,600 total pages to the issue of
damage calculation.85
Infringement damages may be calculated
according to one of three methods: lost profits of
the patentee, profits of the infringer, or a reasonable
royalty analysis.86 The reasonable royalty analysis
poses the question what reasonable parties would have
agreed upon.87 It therefore explicitly disregards the
81. Id. at 288.
82. See id. at 290.
83. See id. at 292.
84. See Bailey, supra note 72, at 257-59.
85. See Rainer Schulte, Patentgesetz mit EPÜ [Patent
Law with EPC] 1431-42 (2008).
86. See id. at 1432.
87. See id. at 1436.
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particular parties’ bargaining positions and the issue if
the patentee would have granted a license in the first
place. Moreover, it is assumed that the parties would
have anticipated the infringement as it is taking place.88
Accordingly, the analysis is carried out completely
ex-post and does not have any ex-ante element of a
hypothetical negotiation between the parties before the
infringement.
The calculation of a reasonable royalty in
Germany is also a combination of the royalty basis
and the royalty rate.89 The royalty basis is the sales
value of the product embodying the invention.90 In
case an inventive component is part of a larger system,
it is to be determined if there is a market for the
inventive component itself: if yes, the sales value of the
component should serve as the royalty basis; if not,
the sales value of the whole system or an estimated
sales value of the component can serve as the royalty
basis.91 Depending on the component or the system
being used as the royalty basis, different royalty rates
have to be used in order to reach equitable results.92
In this way, German damage law follows an economic
apportionment inquiry when a separately sellable
product embodies the invention. When the inventive
component is part of a larger system, the inventive
contribution to the larger system is estimated, which
commonly leads to a relative value analysis of the
individual components. A comprehensive economic
apportionment inquiry, as carried out in the United
States and described above, does not take place.
The royalty rate is a rate that reasonable
parties would have agreed to, when knowing about
the extension of the infringing use of the invention.93
Common industry standards are the reference, which
may be slightly adapted according to an equity analysis
regarding the facts of the case.94 However, no punitive
raising of the royalty rate because of the infringer’s
illegal activity is admissible under German law.95
Depending on the industry, royalty rates between 0.2%
and 6% are standard in Germany, with the chemical
industry being more towards the lower end, the
mechanical industry being closer to the higher end, and
the pharmaceutical and electrical industries falling in
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
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between.96
If we applied the German reasonable royalty
framework to the facts in Cornell, the resulting damage
award would have been lower under the additional
assumptions given below. Cornell established that the
processor was the smallest sellable unit that embodies
the patented method.97 The processor would therefore
also be the starting point for the royalty base in
Germany. However, the instruction reorder buffer is
only one component of the processor. According to
standard processor architecture, other components,
such as the arithmetic logic unit and the control logic,
are seen as the main components.98 Therefore, it is
likely that the instruction reorder buffer would only be
attributed a small share of the value of the processor.
For the hypothetical calculation, it is assumed that
this share would be 10%. A typical royalty rate for
electronic components in Germany would be 2%.99
Accordingly, 0.2% of the processor revenue would
be the reasonable royalty, which would amount to
$13 million. This would be a quarter of the damages
awarded in Cornell by the District Court.100 This
reflects the perception that damage rewards are lower in
Germany.
As this example shows, many facts of the
case are disregarded for the damage calculation in
Germany. The analysis essentially boils down to two
questions: which portion of the value of the sellable
product is attributed to the patented component and
what is an industry-specific royalty rate? Importantly,
the bargaining positions of the parties as well as their
inclinations to license their technologies are not
taken into account. By disregarding these companyspecific, subjective factors, the analysis becomes more
predictable. In this way, the framework also prevents
very large damage awards, although they could be
justified by a party’s market position in a particular
case. It can be concluded that the reflection of a party’s
subjective value of the patent in the damage award
is sacrificed for a rather formalistic and predictable
damage calculation procedure.

96. License/Sales, Copat.de, http://www.copat.de/mn_
verwert_lizenz.htm (GER) (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).
97. See Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F.Supp.2d
279, 283 (N.D.N.Y. 2009)
98. CPU-Central Processing Unit, Webopedia, http://www.
webopedia.com/TERM/C/CPU.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).
99. License/Sales, Copat.de, http://www.copat.de/mn_
verwert_lizenz.htm (GER) (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).
100. See Cornell, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 292.
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VI. Conclusion
German and U.S. law approach the issue of
patent litigation damages in fundamentally different
ways. German law carries out an ex-post analysis of the
infringement actions, attributing a reasonable royalty
to a portion of the sales that are deemed to relate to
the inventive component of a product. In contrast,
US law uses the ex-ante framework of a hypothetical
negotiation between a willing licensee and a willing
licensor. The basic inquiry is which reasonable royalty
the parties would have agreed upon, given their
bargaining position before the infringement took place.
As this comprehensive analysis takes into account
all technical and business aspects of the hypothetical
license, a great deal of uncertainty remains as to the
outcome of the damage awards. The courts are trying
to bring more structure to this analysis by requiring
the patentees to bring forward evidence which portion
of their profits is actually attributable to the invention.
This apportionment framework has brought patent
damages down and increased legal certainty to some
extent. However, a level of legal certainty comparable
to Germany will not be achievable with the given
framework of a hypothetical negotiation. On the
other hand, only such a framework allows a patentee to
recover damages that reflect his individual position, as
is generally desired by awarding the monopoly right of
a patent.
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